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導(dǎo)讀：2022年9月21-23日，英國(guó)國(guó)王學(xué)院與印度政策研究中心聯(lián)合舉辦研討會(huì)“新興亞洲在多極世界中的作用”。在“中國(guó)與南亞”研討環(huán)節(jié)，國(guó)防部國(guó)際軍事合作辦公室安全合作中心前主任，清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心研究員、中國(guó)論壇特約專家周波應(yīng)邀做了主旨發(fā)言。周波在發(fā)言中探討了隨著中國(guó)海外利益的擴(kuò)大，尤其是在南亞經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事存在的加強(qiáng)，印度應(yīng)該如何放下對(duì)中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)的戒備防范心理，管控彼此的分歧，讓中印的雙邊關(guān)系成為世界的穩(wěn)定器。

【文/觀察者網(wǎng)專欄作者 周波】

中國(guó)與絕大多數(shù)南亞國(guó)家友好。展望未來, 中國(guó)在南亞的最大挑戰(zhàn)是如何同印度和平相處。具體來說，需要考慮四個(gè)問題：1、中印如何在邊界問題沒有解決的情況下保持實(shí)控線的和平和安寧； 2、印度如何以開放的心態(tài)看待中國(guó)在南亞的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)和軍事存在；3、印度會(huì)在美國(guó)遏制中國(guó)的印太戰(zhàn)略中扮演什么角色；4、在亞洲世紀(jì)來臨之際，中印如何為新的世界秩序發(fā)揮積極的作用。

一、邊界問題

坦率地說，困擾中印關(guān)系的邊界問題在可見的未來不可能解決，原因是邊境地區(qū)實(shí)際控制線沒有劃定，而中印對(duì)如何解決邊界問題有不同的看法?；旧?，中國(guó)希望采取自上而下的方法，首先確定互諒互讓的政治原則，然后再處理邊界問題；而印度的觀點(diǎn)是采取自下而上的方法，希望通過核定實(shí)際控制線來維持現(xiàn)狀。

2020年6月15日發(fā)生的加勒萬沖突打破了中印邊境長(zhǎng)達(dá)四十多年的和平。這雖然極為不幸，但兩只現(xiàn)代化的軍隊(duì)實(shí)際上是以石器時(shí)代的方式，用石頭和棍棒斗毆。這意味著他們清楚在任何情況下都不應(yīng)向?qū)Ψ介_槍，也說明中印過去建立信任的措施在一定程度上起到了作用。如果雙方從20個(gè)印度士兵和4個(gè)中國(guó)士兵死亡中充分吸取教訓(xùn)，加強(qiáng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控，那么也許我們可以在今后的四十年甚至更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間和平相處。

中印加勒萬沖突一度打破了中印邊境的和平（圖片來源：觀察者網(wǎng)）

當(dāng)下我們應(yīng)該做什么？目前雙方都在邊境部署了大量部隊(duì)。首先，雙方已經(jīng)在班公湖和溫泉地區(qū)等地脫離接觸，這種做法應(yīng)該在其他地方效仿，使雙方部隊(duì)從最危險(xiǎn)的地方脫離接觸，維持中印邊境實(shí)際控制線地區(qū)的和平安寧。

其次，雙方應(yīng)該很好梳理、落實(shí)過去的建立信任措施。中印有五個(gè)關(guān)于信任的協(xié)定和協(xié)議，比中國(guó)與任何其他國(guó)家之間的雙邊信任措施都多，且內(nèi)容豐富具體。例如，中印在邊境實(shí)控線軍事領(lǐng)域建立信任措施協(xié)定規(guī)定，在實(shí)際控制線附近，不應(yīng)該舉行師級(jí)演習(xí)，也就是不超過15000人，如果要舉行旅級(jí)的演習(xí)，也就是5000人，應(yīng)該事先通知對(duì)方，而且不應(yīng)該在距離實(shí)際控制線10公里的近距離內(nèi)出現(xiàn)軍用飛機(jī)。在邊境部隊(duì)協(xié)議規(guī)定，當(dāng)一方的部隊(duì)在巡邏時(shí)，另一方不應(yīng)尾隨。我認(rèn)為，如果雙方都認(rèn)真執(zhí)行了這些規(guī)定，中印并不需要建立新的信任措施。

由于加勒萬河谷發(fā)生的事情，我認(rèn)為印度政府仍然處于一種怨恨、情緒化的狀態(tài)。蘇杰生外長(zhǎng)最近表示亞洲的未來與印中關(guān)系的發(fā)展相連，邊界的狀態(tài)將決定兩國(guó)關(guān)系的狀態(tài)。前半句我同意，但是后半句倒退到印度政府在1988年拉吉夫·甘地訪華前的立場(chǎng)。

邊界問題不是中印獨(dú)有的問題，印度也不僅僅是只同中國(guó)有邊界問題。如果巴基斯坦也要求只有解決了克什米爾問題才能發(fā)展印巴關(guān)系，這聽起來合理嗎？中印邊界問題不應(yīng)該是兩國(guó)關(guān)系正常化難以跨越的障礙，況且沖突中中方也有傷亡。加勒萬河谷事件后，在印中資企業(yè)處境艱難，但2021年，中印雙邊貿(mào)易創(chuàng)下了1256億美元的歷史新高，這說明中印經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的活力已經(jīng)超越了人為的障礙。

二、中國(guó)在南亞的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事存在

中國(guó)必須保持在南亞的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事存在。中國(guó)在包括印度在內(nèi)的南亞國(guó)家有大量投資。對(duì)于聚焦經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的其他南亞國(guó)家而言，“一帶一路”也是難得的機(jī)遇。90%的全球貿(mào)易都通過海路運(yùn)輸，印度洋是世界上最主要的交通樞紐和貿(mào)易通道之一。作為世界上最大的貿(mào)易國(guó)，中國(guó)自然會(huì)關(guān)注海上戰(zhàn)略通道的安全。

印度不愿意看到中國(guó)在南亞擴(kuò)大影響不是秘密，事實(shí)上，許多南亞國(guó)家同中國(guó)的雙邊關(guān)系都在不同程度遭到印度的干涉和打壓。2017年，中國(guó)和印度在中國(guó)和不丹爭(zhēng)議地區(qū)洞朗對(duì)峙長(zhǎng)達(dá)73天。2014年，斯里蘭卡允許一艘中國(guó)潛艇在科倫坡?？浚l(fā)了印度的強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)。2017年，斯里蘭卡拒絕了一艘中國(guó)潛艇?？靠苽惼卵a(bǔ)給的請(qǐng)求，人們普遍認(rèn)為這是新德里向斯里蘭卡施壓的結(jié)果。當(dāng)斯里蘭卡在今年7月12日宣布允許中國(guó)科考船“遠(yuǎn)望5號(hào)”將停靠漢班托塔港進(jìn)行補(bǔ)給時(shí)，印度又對(duì)此提出抗議，導(dǎo)致科倫坡一度要求中國(guó)科考船推遲其到港計(jì)劃。

中國(guó)企業(yè)向斯里蘭卡交付大型工程機(jī)械（圖片來源：新華網(wǎng)）

2014年莫迪政府上臺(tái)后推出對(duì)其南亞鄰國(guó)的“鄰國(guó)優(yōu)先”政策，如果這一政策是印度對(duì)過去自己以老大哥的心態(tài)習(xí)慣性地干涉其弱小鄰國(guó)事務(wù)的反省和調(diào)整，那么我認(rèn)為該政策應(yīng)該包括印度對(duì)其鄰國(guó)發(fā)展與中國(guó)關(guān)系的尊重，印度不應(yīng)該干涉其南亞鄰國(guó)主權(quán)，逼其在中印之間選邊站隊(duì)。

相比之下，中國(guó)從來沒有阻撓印度的“向東看”或者“向東行動(dòng)”計(jì)劃。東南亞對(duì)中國(guó)地緣環(huán)境重要，但是中國(guó)從來沒有干涉印度同東南亞任何國(guó)家發(fā)展政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事關(guān)系。印度總是抱怨中國(guó)向巴基斯坦提供軍事裝備，但是中國(guó)從來沒有抱怨俄羅斯向印度提供軍事裝備。2017年，中國(guó)以寬厚的胸襟接納印度和巴基斯坦同時(shí)加入上合組織。

我想無須提醒大家，明朝時(shí)，鄭和艦隊(duì)—世界上最強(qiáng)大的艦隊(duì)就7下西洋，所以中國(guó)不是印度洋的新來者。為了維護(hù)中國(guó)在印度洋不斷增長(zhǎng)的利益，維護(hù)海上戰(zhàn)略通道的安全，中國(guó)海軍必須保持甚至加強(qiáng)其在印度洋的存在。中國(guó)航母打擊群出現(xiàn)在印度洋只是時(shí)間問題。

自2008年底以來，中國(guó)海軍一直不停地派出海軍編隊(duì)在印度洋的亞丁灣和索馬里盆地進(jìn)行巡邏。2017年，中國(guó)在吉布提建立了第一個(gè)海外軍事基地，以保障反海盜行動(dòng)。但沒有任何例子可以證明中國(guó)在印度洋的軍事存在給印度造成安全損害。事實(shí)上，雙方有過卓有成效的合作。2011年5月，中印兩國(guó)海軍曾與北約合作，營(yíng)救了被索馬里海盜劫持的中國(guó)“富城”號(hào)商船。今后，中國(guó)和印度的海軍艦艇勢(shì)必會(huì)更頻繁地在印度洋海上相遇。如果印度以“大婆羅多(Akhand Bharat)”心態(tài)認(rèn)為印度洋是“印度教徒的偉大海洋”(Hindu Mahasagar) 或者印度是印度洋“凈安全提供者”，雙方之間的摩擦甚至沖突就有可能發(fā)生。

三、美國(guó)的印太戰(zhàn)略

美國(guó)的印太戰(zhàn)略以遏制中國(guó)的發(fā)展為中心，為此，印度對(duì)美國(guó)的重要性必定會(huì)增加。公平地說，印度盡管希望限制中國(guó)在南亞的存在，但迄今為止抵擋住了把四國(guó)安全對(duì)話機(jī)制(Quad)變成一個(gè)反華俱樂部的誘惑。在Quad中，其他三個(gè)國(guó)家都已經(jīng)是盟友，所以印度的態(tài)度對(duì)機(jī)制的生存和發(fā)展至關(guān)重要。有人稱Quad為“亞洲版北約”，我不這么認(rèn)為。Quad實(shí)際上正在朝向許多其他方向，如基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)、氣候變化或向東南亞國(guó)家聯(lián)合分發(fā)疫苗等發(fā)展。就其軍事內(nèi)容而言，目前僅有一個(gè)名為“馬拉巴爾”的軍事演習(xí)。

如果印度選擇投入美國(guó)的懷抱，不僅中印關(guān)系將惡化，印俄關(guān)系也會(huì)下滑。同中國(guó)一樣，俄羅斯也被美國(guó)視為戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手之一。俄羅斯是印度最大的武器供應(yīng)國(guó)，占據(jù)了印度一半以上的市場(chǎng)份額。印度對(duì)于美國(guó)的任何示好都會(huì)引起俄羅斯的警覺，結(jié)果是印度的戰(zhàn)略自主性和在大國(guó)間的回旋余地將大大萎縮。

印度總理莫迪與俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京（圖片來源：ICphoto)

作為不結(jié)盟運(yùn)動(dòng)的創(chuàng)始國(guó)之一，中立公正的立場(chǎng)而不是權(quán)宜之計(jì)最符合印度的國(guó)家利益。在過去幾年中，印度幾乎在以美國(guó)的口吻地談?wù)摗白杂砷_放的印太”，問題是印度的立場(chǎng)實(shí)際上與中國(guó)的更像，而不是與美國(guó)的更近。中國(guó)和印度都反對(duì)外國(guó)在自己的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的軍事活動(dòng)。印度法律規(guī)定，當(dāng)有外國(guó)軍艦進(jìn)入印度的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)進(jìn)行軍事演習(xí)時(shí)，如果涉及彈藥和爆炸物，印度政府會(huì)要求他們首先征得印度政府的同意。這與中國(guó)的相關(guān)法律相比更嚴(yán)苛。中國(guó)在2006年即根據(jù)《公約》第298條將涉及海洋劃界、歷史性海灣或所有權(quán)、軍事和執(zhí)法活動(dòng)等方面的爭(zhēng)端排除出《公約》強(qiáng)制爭(zhēng)端解決程序，同中國(guó)一樣，印度也對(duì)《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》第298條持有保留。

真正在印度洋挑戰(zhàn)印度權(quán)益的是美國(guó)。2021年4月，美國(guó)約翰·保羅·瓊斯號(hào)驅(qū)逐艦駛?cè)肓擞《任髂喜康膶俳?jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)，美國(guó)海軍第七艦隊(duì)發(fā)表書面聲明稱這樣做是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)將挑戰(zhàn)印度的“過度海洋主張”，印度為此抗議。印度專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)占印度洋的三十分之一。換言之，美國(guó)挑戰(zhàn)印度的主張意味著，至少在美國(guó)人眼里，1/30的印度洋是因?yàn)橛《炔挪蛔杂?、不開放的。

最近印度和美國(guó)宣布計(jì)劃在10月舉行一次聯(lián)合演習(xí)，演習(xí)地點(diǎn)距離中國(guó)和印度的實(shí)際控制線只不到100公里。我不清楚為什么印度要跟美國(guó)在中印邊境附近搞這種象征意義大于實(shí)際內(nèi)容的演習(xí)。難道印度是想讓中國(guó)相信，如果中印邊境再次爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，美國(guó)會(huì)出兵幫助印度嗎？如果不是，這種姿態(tài)顯然并不明智。

四、亞洲世紀(jì)

在可見的將來，國(guó)際秩序?qū)⑹腔靵y的多極。在歐洲，俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不知道會(huì)持續(xù)多久，但是之后肯定會(huì)迎來另一場(chǎng)冷戰(zhàn)，因?yàn)闅W洲的安全說到底是俄羅斯如何和北約共處的問題。在亞洲，美國(guó)的印太戰(zhàn)略清晰地以遏制中國(guó)為目標(biāo)，中方?jīng)]有奢望中美關(guān)系將會(huì)大幅改善。

21世紀(jì)最大的問題不是中國(guó)是否能夠崛起。如果中國(guó)保持5.5%的增長(zhǎng)率，這個(gè)問題將于10年內(nèi)中國(guó)成為世界第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體劃上句號(hào)。最大的問題是美國(guó)的衰落是相對(duì)的還是絕對(duì)的？雖然結(jié)論尚早，但是美國(guó)已經(jīng)從二戰(zhàn)后占世界GDP的1/2下降到今天大約25%?？紤]到美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)族群不可調(diào)和的矛盾、兩黨沒有底線的相互攻訐和民眾普遍對(duì)未來甚至打內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的擔(dān)憂，如果說美國(guó)已經(jīng)失去了方向感，恐怕并不為過。美國(guó)對(duì)印太的關(guān)注其實(shí)是其全球?qū)嵙ο陆岛笫湛s的必然反映，但是打壓一個(gè)完全融入國(guó)際體系的中國(guó)不僅是美國(guó)自911以來最嚴(yán)重的戰(zhàn)略誤判，也是徒勞無益的，很難得到其他國(guó)家的支持。

1988年鄧小平會(huì)見拉吉夫·甘地時(shí)說：“中印兩國(guó)不發(fā)展起來就不是‘亞洲世紀(jì)’。真正的‘亞太世紀(jì)’或‘亞洲世紀(jì)’，是要等到中國(guó)、印度和其他一些鄰國(guó)發(fā)展起來才算到來”。國(guó)際社會(huì)普遍認(rèn)為國(guó)際地緣政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)重心正在向亞洲轉(zhuǎn)移，到2030年，中國(guó)會(huì)成為世界第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，而印度會(huì)超過日本成為亞洲第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。所以亞洲的崛起是包括中印在內(nèi)廣大亞洲國(guó)家集體的崛起，但是如果中印都發(fā)展起來，卻彼此關(guān)系緊張，這也不能說明亞洲世紀(jì)已經(jīng)到來。

1988年鄧小平會(huì)見拉吉夫·甘地（圖片來源：網(wǎng)絡(luò)）

由于目前中印關(guān)系的氛圍不佳，印度政府對(duì)中國(guó)采取了一些看似強(qiáng)硬的態(tài)度以試圖吸引公眾輿論。例如，在俄烏沖突中，中印立場(chǎng)高度相似，雙方不約而同保持中立。但印度政府刻意試圖表現(xiàn)其立場(chǎng)上如何與中國(guó)不同。坦率地講，雙方的區(qū)別可能是兩只蘋果之間的差別，而不是一個(gè)蘋果和一個(gè)梨子之間的差別。

在過去相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)，中國(guó)有不少人認(rèn)為中國(guó)同美國(guó)的關(guān)系是“好也好不到哪里去，壞也壞不到哪里去”，現(xiàn)在估計(jì)很少人這么想了。那么中印關(guān)系是不是也是“好也好不到哪里去，壞也壞不到哪里去”呢？如果聽天由命，這種態(tài)度不僅是不負(fù)責(zé)任的， 而且真的可能促使雙方關(guān)系朝壞的方向發(fā)展。中印社會(huì)制度不同，但都是全球化的受益者，都是新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，都支持世界多極化和國(guó)際關(guān)系民主化。在世界秩序更加不確定的時(shí)代，如果中印以開放的心態(tài)看待對(duì)方的發(fā)展，管控彼此的分歧，這一重要的雙邊關(guān)系可以成為世界的穩(wěn)定器。

作者發(fā)言原文：

Can China and India coexist in South Asia?

China is on friendly terms with the vast majority of South Asian nations. In the years ahead, China's biggest challenge in South Asia is how to live peacefully with India. Specifically, four issues need to be considered: 1. how China and India can maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control where the border dispute has not yet been resolved; 2. how India can view China’s economic activities and military presence in South Asia with an open mind; 3. what role India will play in the American Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China; 4. how China and India can play a positive role in the new world order at the dawn of the Asian century.

1.The Sino-Indian Border Dispute

Frankly speaking, the border dispute plaguing China-India relations cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future due to the lack of demarcation of the Line of Actual Control and the different views China and India have on border dispute resolution. Essentially, China hopes to take a top-down approach by first agreeing on the political principles of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation before dealing with the border dispute, while the Indian perspective consists a bottom-up approach, which involves an intent to maintain the status quo by verifying the Line of Actual Control.

The Galwan clash on June 15, 2020 shattered more than 40 years of peace in the Sino-Indian border. While this is extremely unfortunate, the two modern militaries actually fought in Stone Age fashion, with stones and clubs. This meant that they knew they should not shoot at each other under any circumstances, and also revealed that past confidence-building measures between China and India have worked to a certain extent. If the two sides can fully learn from the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and 4 Chinese soldiers and strengthen risk management, it is possible that we can live in peace for the next 40 years or even more.

So, what should we do now? Both sides are currently deploying large numbers of troops along the border. First, both sides have already disengaged in areas such as Pangong Lake and Hot Spring, and this practice should be followed in other places to disengage both nations’ militaries from the most dangerous places and maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian border areas.

Second, the two sides should tease out and implement past confidence-building measures. China and India have five agreements and protocols on confidence--more than any other bilateral confidence measures between China and other countries, and they are rich and specific. For example, the Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas stipulates that division-level exercises should not be held near the Line of Actual Control, that is, they should not involve more than 15000 personnel. If brigade-level exercises are to be held, that is, if they involve 5000 personnel, the other side should be notified in advance, and military aircrafts should not be present within a close range of 10 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control. The Agreement stipulates that when troops from one side are patrolling, the other side should not trail behind closely. I do not think there is a need for new confidence-building measures between China and India if both sides are serious about implementing these established provisions.

Because of what happened in the Galwan Valley, I think the Indian government is still in a state of resentment and affect. Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar recently stated that “the future of Asia is linked to the development of India-China relations and the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.” I agree with the first half of the statement, but the second half goes back to the Indian government’s position before Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988. Border disputes are not unique to China and India, and India does not only have border disputes with China. If Pakistan also requires that the Kashmir issue to be resolved before developing India-Pakistan relations, does that sound reasonable? The Sino-Indian border issue should not be an insurmountable obstacle to the normalization of relations between the two countries, not to mention that the Chinese side also suffered casualties in the clash. After the Galwan skirmish, Chinese-funded enterprises in India were in a difficult situation, but by 2021, bilateral trade between China and India rose to a record $125.6 billion USD, demonstrating that vitality of China-India economic relations has surpassed man-made obstacles.

2.China’s Economic and Military Presence in South Asia

China must maintain an economic and military presence in South Asia. China has substantial investments in South Asian countries, including India. For other South Asian countries focusing on economic development, the Belt and Road Initiative is also a rare opportunity. Up to 90% of global trade is transported by sea, and the Indian Ocean is one of the most important transportation hubs and trade routes in the world. As the world's largest trading nation, China naturally pays much attention to the security of strategic sea lanes.

It is no secret that India does not want to see China's expanding influence in South Asia. In fact, the bilateral relations between many South Asian countries and China have been interfered with and suppressed by India to varying degrees. In 2017, China and India faced off for 73 days in Doklam, a disputed region between China and Bhutan. In 2014, Sri Lanka allowed a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo, triggering strong opposition from India. In 2017, Sri Lanka rejected a request by a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo for replenishment, and the rejection was widely believed to be the result of New Delhi's pressure on Sri Lanka. When Sri Lanka announced on July 12 this year that it would allow the Chinese research vessel Yuanwang-5 to dock in the Hambantota Port for replenishment, India protested again, leading Colombo to request the Chinese research vessel to delay its planned arrival at the port.

After the Modi government came into power in 2014, it launched a Neighborhood First policy for its South Asian neighbors. If this policy is a retrospection and adjustment of India's past tendency to interfere in the affairs of its weaker and smaller neighbors with a big brother mentality, then I think this policy should also include India's respect for its neighbors in developing relations with China, and India should not interfere with the sovereignty of its South Asian neighbors and force them to take a side between China and India. In contrast, China has never thwarted India's "Look East" or "Act East" policy. Southeast Asia is important to China's geographical environment, but China has never interfered in India's development of its political, economic, and military relations with any Southeast Asian country. India always complains about China’s provision of military equipment to Pakistan, but China never complains about Russia’s provision of military equipment to India. In 2017, China accepted India and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with openness and generosity.

I do not think it's necessary to remind everyone that during the Ming Dynasty, Zheng He's fleet, the most powerful fleet in the world, went to the Indian Ocean seven times. Therefore, China is not a newcomer to the Indian Ocean. To safeguard China's growing interests in the Indian Ocean and maintain the security of strategic sea lanes, the Chinese navy must maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean. It is only a matter of time before a Chinese carrier strike group appears in the Indian Ocean. Since the end of 2008, the Chinese navy has been sending naval formations to patrol the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin in the Indian Ocean. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti to safeguard anti-piracy operations. But there is no instance of Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean causing security damage to India. In fact, the two sides have had fruitful cooperation. In May 2011, the Chinese and Indian navies cooperated with NATO to rescue the Chinese merchant vessel Full City, which was hijacked by Somali pirates. In the future, Chinese and Indian naval vessels are bound to meet more frequently in the Indian Ocean. Friction and even conflict between the two sides is possible if India, with an Akhand Bharat mentality, regards the Indian Ocean as the “Great Ocean for Hindus” (Hindu Mahasagar) or India as a “net security provider” for the Indian Ocean.

3.The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States

The American Indo-Pacific strategy centers around containing Chinese development, and to that end, India’s importance to the U.S. is bound to increase. To be fair, India, despite its desire to limit China's presence in South Asia, has so far resisted the temptation to turn the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) into an anti-China club. Within the Quad, the other three nations are already allies, so India's attitude is crucial to the survival and development of the Quad. Some call the Quad the "Asian NATO." But I don't think so. The Quad is actually heading in many other directions, such as infrastructure development, climate change, and the distribution of vaccines to Southeast Asian countries. In terms of its military dimension, there is currently only one military exercise—the Malabar Exercise.

If India chooses to fall into the arms of the United States, not only will China-India relations deteriorate, India-Russia relations will also decline. Like China, Russia is also seen by the United States as one of its strategic competitors. Russia is India's largest arms supplier, accounting for more than half of India's market share. Any gesture of favor by India to the United States will arouse Russia's alarm, resulting in the reduction of India’s strategic autonomy and room for maneuver among major powers.

As one of the founding nations of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has an interest in taking a stance of neutrality and impartiality rather than expediency. For the past few years, India has been talking about a "free and open Indo-Pacific" almost in the language used by the United States, but the problem is that India's position is actually more like that of China than that of the United States. Both China and India oppose foreign military activities in their exclusive economic zones. Indian law stipulates that when foreign warships enter India's exclusive economic zone for military exercises and ammunition and explosives are involved, the Indian government will require them to obtain the consent of the Indian government first. This is more stringent than the corresponding relevant laws in China. In 2006, China excluded disputes involving maritime delimitation, historic bays or ownership, and military and law enforcement activities from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in accordance with Article 298 of the Convention. Like China, India also has reservations on Article 298 of the UNCLOS.

The real challenger to India's rights and interests in the Indian Ocean is the United States. In April 2021, destroyer USS John Paul Jones sailed into the exclusive economic zone in southwest India. The US Navy's Seventh Fleet issued a written statement saying it did so because the US would challenge India's "excessive maritime claims," which was met with Indian backlash. India's exclusive economic zone covers one-thirtieth of the Indian Ocean. In other words, the United States' claim to challenge India means that, at least in the eyes of Americans, 1/30 of the Indian Ocean is not free and open because of India.

India and the United States have recently announced plans to hold a joint exercise in October, at a location less than 100 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control between China and India. I am not sure as to why India is engaging with the US in exercises that are more symbolic than substantive near the Sino-Indian border. Does India want China to believe that if war breaks out again along the Sino-Indian border, the United States will send troops to help India? If not, the gesture is clearly unwise.

4. The Asian Century

In the foreseeable future, the international order will be chaotic and multipolar. In Europe, it is uncertain how long the Russo-Ukrainian war will last. However, there will definitely be another Cold War following that, because the security of Europe is ultimately a question of how Russia and NATO intend to coexist. In Asia, the American Indo-Pacific strategy clearly aims to contain China, and China has no high hopes that China-U.S. relations will improve drastically.

The biggest question of the 21st century is not whether China can rise. If China maintains a growth rate of 5.5%, this question will come to an end within 10 years of China becoming the world's largest economy. Rather, the biggest question is, will America's decline be relative or absolute? Although it is too early to conclude, the United States has fallen from one-half of world GDP after World War II to about 25% today. Considering the irreconcilable tensions between racial groups in the United States, the willingness of the two political parties to criticize each other to no limit, and the general public's worries about the future or even a civil war, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the United States has lost its sense of direction. The American focus on the Indo-Pacific is actually an inevitable reflection of its shrinking global power. Suppressing a China that is fully integrated into the international system is not only the most serious strategic miscalculation by the U.S. since 9/11; it is also a futile plan that has difficulty attracting support from other countries.

When Deng Xiaoping met with Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, he said: "There will not be an 'Asian century' unless if China and India develop. The real 'Asia-Pacific century' or 'Asian century' will wait until China, India, and some other neighboring countries have developed and risen.” The international community generally believes that the international geopolitical and economic center of gravity is shifting to Asia. By 2030, China will have become the world's largest economy, while India will have surpassed Japan to become the second largest Asian economy. Therefore, the rise of Asia entails the collective rise of a vast number of Asian countries, including China and India. However, if both China and India develop but their relations are tense, this will not mean that the Asian century has come.

Due to the current poor outlook of Sino-Indian relations, the Indian government has taken some seemingly tough stances towards China in an attempt to attract public attention. For example, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the positions of China and India are considerably similar, and both sides have maintained neutrality. But the Indian government is deliberately trying to demonstrate how its position differs from that of China. Frankly, the differences between the two nations are similar to the differences between two apples, not to the differences between an apple and a pear.

For quite a long time in the past, many people in China believed that relations between China and the United States were "not going to get much better, and not going to get much worse." However, few people would think this way now. So, are China-India relations also "not going to get much better, and not going to get much worse"? If left to fate, such an attitude is not only irresponsible but can also push China-India relations in a deleterious direction. China and India have different social systems, but they are both beneficiaries of globalization. They are both emerging economies, and both nations support world multi-polarization as well as the democratization of international relations. In an era of increasingly uncertain world order, if China and India view each other's developments with an open mind and are able to manage their differences, this important bilateral relationship can become a stabilizer for the world.

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