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來(lái)源 | 盲人摸摸象

Monetary Policy and Price StabilityRemarks

by Jerome H. Powell Chair

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at

“Reassessing Constraints on the Economy and Policy,” an economic policy symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Jackson Hole, Wyoming

謝謝各位，今天有機(jī)會(huì)在這里發(fā)言。

在過(guò)去的杰克遜霍爾會(huì)議上，我討論了一些廣泛的話題，如不斷變化的經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)，以及在高度不確定性下執(zhí)行貨幣政策的挑戰(zhàn)。今天，我的發(fā)言將會(huì)更短，我的重點(diǎn)將會(huì)更窄，我傳達(dá)的信息將會(huì)更直接。

美國(guó)聯(lián)邦公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)(FOMC)目前的首要任務(wù)是將通貨膨脹率降至2%的目標(biāo)。價(jià)格穩(wěn)定是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的責(zé)任，也是我們經(jīng)濟(jì)的基石。如果沒(méi)有價(jià)格穩(wěn)定，經(jīng)濟(jì)就對(duì)任何人都不利。特別是，如果價(jià)格不穩(wěn)定，我們將無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)有利于所有人的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)強(qiáng)勁狀況的持續(xù)時(shí)期。高通脹的負(fù)擔(dān)主要落在那些最無(wú)力承受的人身上。

恢復(fù)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定需要一段時(shí)間，需要大力使用我們的工具來(lái)使供需達(dá)到更好的平衡。降低通脹率可能需要一段持續(xù)的低于趨勢(shì)的增長(zhǎng)時(shí)期。此外，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的狀況很可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些疲軟。雖然利率上升、經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩和勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)狀況疲軟將降低通脹，但它們也將給家庭和企業(yè)帶來(lái)一些痛苦。這些都是降低通貨膨脹的不幸代價(jià)。但如果不能恢復(fù)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定，將意味著更大的痛苦。

美國(guó)S.經(jīng)濟(jì)明顯較2021年的歷史最高增長(zhǎng)率放緩，這反映了大流行衰退后經(jīng)濟(jì)重新開(kāi)放。雖然最新的經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)好壞參半，但在我看來(lái)，我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)繼續(xù)顯示出強(qiáng)勁的潛在勢(shì)頭。勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)特別強(qiáng)勁，但它顯然是不平衡的，對(duì)工人的需求遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了供應(yīng)可用的工人。通貨膨脹率遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)2%，高通貨膨脹率繼續(xù)在整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)中蔓延。雖然7月份較低的通脹數(shù)據(jù)受到歡迎，但一個(gè)月的改善遠(yuǎn)低于歐盟委員會(huì)在我們相信通脹正在下降之前需要看到的改善。

我們正在有目的地將我們的政策立場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移到一個(gè)足夠限制的水平，使通貨膨脹恢復(fù)到2%。在我們7月的最近一次會(huì)議上，F(xiàn)OMC將聯(lián)邦基金利率的目標(biāo)范圍提高到2.25-2.5%，這是經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)摘要(SEP)對(duì)聯(lián)邦基金利率預(yù)計(jì)長(zhǎng)期結(jié)算地點(diǎn)的估計(jì)范圍。在目前的情況下，由于通脹率遠(yuǎn)高于2%，而勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)極其緊張，對(duì)長(zhǎng)期中性的估計(jì)不是一個(gè)可以停止或暫停的地方。

7月份目標(biāo)區(qū)間的增長(zhǎng)是眾多會(huì)議中第二次增長(zhǎng)75個(gè)基點(diǎn)，我當(dāng)時(shí)說(shuō)，在我們下次會(huì)議上，再次異常大的增長(zhǎng)可能是合適的。我們現(xiàn)在的會(huì)議期間已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了一半。我們?cè)?月會(huì)議上的決定將取決于新公布的總體數(shù)據(jù)和不斷變化的前景。在某種程度上，隨著貨幣政策的立場(chǎng)進(jìn)一步收緊，放慢加息步伐可能是合適的。恢復(fù)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定可能需要在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)保持一個(gè)限制性的政策立場(chǎng)。歷史記錄強(qiáng)烈警告人們不要過(guò)早地放松政策。委員會(huì)參與者對(duì)6月9日進(jìn)行的最新個(gè)人預(yù)測(cè)顯示，到2023年底，聯(lián)邦基金利率中值略低于4%。與會(huì)者將在9月份的會(huì)議上更新他們的預(yù)測(cè)。

我們對(duì)貨幣政策的審議和決定建立在我們從上世紀(jì)70年代和80年代的高波動(dòng)通脹以及過(guò)去25年的低穩(wěn)定通脹中了解到的關(guān)于通脹動(dòng)態(tài)的基礎(chǔ)上。特別是，我們正在吸取了三個(gè)重要的教訓(xùn)。

第一個(gè)教訓(xùn)是，央行能夠而且應(yīng)該承擔(dān)起實(shí)現(xiàn)低而穩(wěn)定的通脹的責(zé)任。央行官員和其他人曾經(jīng)在這兩個(gè)方面需要被說(shuō)服，這似乎很奇怪，但正如前主席伯南克所表明的那樣，這兩種主張?jiān)诖笸洉r(shí)期都受到了廣泛質(zhì)疑。1今天，我們認(rèn)為這些問(wèn)題已經(jīng)得到了解決。我們提供價(jià)格穩(wěn)定的責(zé)任是無(wú)條件的。的確，當(dāng)前的高通脹是一種全球現(xiàn)象，世界上許多經(jīng)濟(jì)體都面臨著比美國(guó)一樣高或更高的通脹。在我看來(lái)，美國(guó)目前的高通貨膨脹率也確實(shí)是強(qiáng)勁需求和供應(yīng)受限的產(chǎn)物，而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的工具主要作用于總需求。所有這些都不會(huì)削弱美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)履行我們指定的實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定任務(wù)的責(zé)任。顯然，在緩和需求以更好地適應(yīng)供應(yīng)方面有一件工作要做。我們致力于做這項(xiàng)工作。

第二個(gè)教訓(xùn)是，公眾對(duì)未來(lái)通脹的預(yù)期可以在設(shè)定通脹道路方面發(fā)揮重要作用。如今，從許多指標(biāo)來(lái)看，長(zhǎng)期通脹預(yù)期似乎保持良好。對(duì)家庭、企業(yè)和預(yù)測(cè)者的調(diào)查以及基于市場(chǎng)的措施都是如此好但這不是自滿的理由，通脹在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于我們的目標(biāo)。如果公眾預(yù)計(jì)通脹將在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)保持低且穩(wěn)定，那么，如果沒(méi)有重大沖擊，很可能會(huì)如此。不幸的是，對(duì)高而波動(dòng)的通脹的預(yù)期也是如此。在20世紀(jì)70年代，隨著通貨膨脹率的攀升，對(duì)高通脹的預(yù)期在家庭和企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策中開(kāi)始根深蒂固。通貨膨脹上升得越多，就有越多的人期望它保持在高水平，他們?cè)诠べY和定價(jià)決策中建立了這種信念。正如前主席保羅·沃爾克在1979年大通脹的高峰期所說(shuō)，“通脹在一定程度上助長(zhǎng)了通脹本身，所以恢復(fù)一個(gè)更穩(wěn)定、更有生產(chǎn)力的經(jīng)濟(jì)的部分工作必須是打破通脹預(yù)期的控制?！标P(guān)于實(shí)際通貨膨脹如何影響對(duì)其未來(lái)道路的預(yù)期的一個(gè)有用的見(jiàn)解是基于“理性忽視”的概念。3當(dāng)通脹持續(xù)高企時(shí)，家庭和企業(yè)必須密切關(guān)注通脹，并將通脹納入其經(jīng)濟(jì)決策。當(dāng)通脹率較低且穩(wěn)定時(shí)，他們可以更自由地將注意力集中在其他地方。前主席格林斯潘是這樣說(shuō)的：“實(shí)際上，價(jià)格穩(wěn)定意味著平均價(jià)格水平的預(yù)期變化足夠小、足夠漸進(jìn)，不會(huì)實(shí)質(zhì)性地進(jìn)入商業(yè)和家庭財(cái)務(wù)決策?！?br/>

當(dāng)然，通脹現(xiàn)在幾乎引起了所有人的關(guān)注，這突出了今天一個(gè)特殊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：當(dāng)前一輪高通脹持續(xù)的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)，高通脹預(yù)期根深蒂固的可能性就越大。這就給我想到了第三節(jié)課，那就是我們必須堅(jiān)持下去，直到工作完成。歷史表明，隨著高通脹在工資和價(jià)格設(shè)定中變得更加根深蒂固，降低通脹的就業(yè)成本很可能會(huì)隨著延遲而增加。上世紀(jì)80年代初，沃爾克成功解除通脹，在過(guò)去15年里多次試圖降低通脹失敗。最終需要一段漫長(zhǎng)的非常嚴(yán)格的貨幣政策來(lái)遏制高通脹，并開(kāi)始將通脹降至低至去年春季之前的穩(wěn)定水平的過(guò)程。我們的目標(biāo)是通過(guò)立即采取果斷行動(dòng)來(lái)避免這種結(jié)果。這些教訓(xùn)正在指導(dǎo)我們使用我們的工具來(lái)降低通貨膨脹。我們正在采取有力而迅速的措施來(lái)緩和需求，使其更好地與供應(yīng)保持一致，并保持通脹預(yù)期。我們將繼續(xù)堅(jiān)持下去，直到我們確信工作已經(jīng)完成為止。

英文演講原文如下：

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever- changing structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my message more direct.

The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.

Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month’s improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection’s (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

July’s increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants’ most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period. Today, we regard these questions as settled.Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional.It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States.It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed’s tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve’s responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

The second lesson is that the public’s expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time.Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored.That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will.Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation.During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, “Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations.”

One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of “rational inattention.” When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions.When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: “For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions.”

Of course, inflation has just about everyone’s attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done.History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.