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導(dǎo)讀：編者按：清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波前日在《南華早報》發(fā)表評論文章“To avert war across the Taiwan Strait, the US must reinvigorate the one-China policy”（為避免臺灣海峽的戰(zhàn)爭，美國必須重新充實“一個中國”政策）。周波提出，中美現(xiàn)在需要做的是“確保相互共存” （Mutually Assured Coexistence），而不是像冷戰(zhàn)時期美蘇之間的“確保相互摧毀”（Mutually Assured Destruction）。臺灣問題是這一確保的底線。如何避免臺灣海峽爆發(fā)沖突，周波建議美國從推動臺灣當局接受“九二共識”、并勸阻其議（官）員訪臺開始，從而使大陸相信和平統(tǒng)一仍有可能。北京在臺灣問題上的戰(zhàn)略耐心，對華盛頓來說是一個避免付出過高代價的機會。

【文/觀察者網(wǎng)專欄作者 周波】

隨著中美關(guān)系“自由落體”式跌落，兩國共存的底線不再是增加互信，而是避免似乎越來越有可能發(fā)生的臺海沖突。

自特朗普執(zhí)政開始，（中美之間）“一報還一報”式的惡性循環(huán)呈螺旋上升趨勢。今年8月，美國眾議院議長佩洛西不顧中方的警告竄訪臺灣，將事態(tài)推向高潮。中國人民解放軍的反應(yīng)是在臺灣周邊的六個區(qū)域進行了史無前例的軍事演習(xí)，事實上把臺灣島封鎖了三天。

如何避免一場雙方都不想看到的沖突？很簡單：讓中國相信，兩岸和平統(tǒng)一仍有可能。這意味著臺灣當局重新回到“一個中國”原則，而美國亦重拾其聲稱一直堅持的“一個中國”政策。

這并不容易。1992年，大陸與臺灣執(zhí)政的國民黨都同意只有“一個中國”，盡管在“一個中國”定義上有分歧。但是，以蔡英文為首的臺灣當局聲稱，臺灣從未接受過“九二共識”。北京方面擔(dān)心，如果僵局持續(xù)下去，一個由分裂主義者領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的臺灣可能會永遠保持事實上的獨立。

美國堅稱其尊重一個中國原則，但卻向臺灣出售了價值數(shù)百億美元的軍火。拜登總統(tǒng)還不止一次地表示，美國將在臺灣受到大陸攻擊時保衛(wèi)臺灣。

近日，美國兩黨合作的《臺灣政策法》(Taiwan Policy Act of 2022)提議將臺灣列為其“主要非北約盟友”。面對日漸緊張的局勢，北京有理由懷疑，華盛頓正在尋求基辛格所說的“某種‘兩個中國’的解決方案”。

美國聲稱其堅持“一個中國”政策，但其行為似乎已有違中美聯(lián)合公報

華盛頓需要捫心自問來回答兩個問題。首先，如果臺灣有可能將美國卷入一場與其實力相當?shù)母偁帉κ值膽?zhàn)爭，它還會是美國的正資產(chǎn)嗎？其次，如果美國因為擔(dān)心發(fā)生第三次世界大戰(zhàn)而不想在烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭中與俄羅斯對抗，那它為何要冒險與中國對抗？美國反復(fù)進行的戰(zhàn)爭推演已表明，如果在臺灣海峽與中國軍隊發(fā)生直接沖突，美國可能會吃敗仗。

或者，是不是因為中國的核武庫比俄羅斯的小得多，且中國承諾“不首先使用”核武器？撇開核武器，中國的軍事實力不會遜于俄羅斯。

中國人民解放軍是世界上最大的武裝力量，其國防開支是俄羅斯的三倍多。解放軍甚至擁有比美軍更多的海軍艦艇。如果北京認為是俄羅斯無人能比的核武庫阻止了美國的干涉行動，那么中國擴大自身的核武庫也就是一念之間。

北京和華盛頓就避免發(fā)生?？找馔膺_成了一些戰(zhàn)術(shù)性協(xié)議，問題是，臺灣海峽一旦發(fā)生沖突則絕非意外。如果北京認為任何關(guān)于“護欄”的建議都只是美國阻礙中國實現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一的詭計，這些護欄將不會被搭建。

關(guān)于美國如何通過增強臺灣自衛(wèi)能力將其變成“豪豬”，已經(jīng)談得夠多了。但是再多一些水雷、武裝無人機和反艦導(dǎo)彈，也無法改變大局。

比起上一次即1995-1996年在臺灣海峽進行的導(dǎo)彈演習(xí)，今天中國人民解放軍更有信心和能力守住中國的“紅線”。只有180公里寬的臺灣海峽，未來只會讓解放軍覺得越來越“窄”。

北京仍然保持著戰(zhàn)略耐心，這是華盛頓的一個機會。不少西方國家懷疑烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭將促使北京很快拿下臺灣。目前沒有跡象能證明這一點。

烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭開始后，中國公布的最新軍事預(yù)算仍低于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的2%，與過去幾十年保持一致，這是北京展現(xiàn)耐心的最佳例子。中國從未宣布統(tǒng)一的時間表，畢竟，如果臺灣島被打得稀爛，又有什么用？

因此，充實而不是掏空“一個中國”政策符合美國的利益。鑒于其與兩岸的廣泛聯(lián)系，美國可以充當一名誠實的中間人，在兩岸關(guān)系中發(fā)揮獨特的作用。第一步，華盛頓應(yīng)該推動臺灣當局接受一中共識。

時任臺灣地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人馬英九做出的一中承諾為臺灣帶來了巨大的好處，這包括大陸不動搖臺灣與個別國家的所謂“外交”關(guān)系的默契。臺灣越早與大陸進行對話， 收益就越大。只有這樣才能讓北京相信，臺灣海峽仍有和平可言。

其次，美國需要更加自律。即便拜登和五角大樓不喜歡佩洛西竄訪臺灣，但還是發(fā)生了。北京不會天真到相信拜登無法打個電話叫停這次行程。

美國官員對臺灣的訪問可能會增加，也只是象征性的。然而，這都會招致中國堅定和實質(zhì)性的回應(yīng)。隨著中美沖突的可能性增大，臺灣也將面臨更大的壓力。

冷戰(zhàn)的一個經(jīng)驗教訓(xùn)是，即便敵人也可以找到避免軍事沖突的方法。中美現(xiàn)在還不是敵人。在一場雙方可能同歸于盡的冷戰(zhàn)中，對兩個對手最有利的情況是相互確保共存。戰(zhàn)爭不一定不可避免，但防患于未然需要格外努力。

翻譯/中國論壇 徐亞暉

核譯/中國論壇 許馨勻、韓樺

原文：

To avert war across the Taiwan Strait, the US must reinvigorate the one-China policy

With China-US relations in free fall, the bare minimum needed for both powers to coexist is not to increase trust, but to avert a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, something that looks increasingly likely.

Since the Trump administration, a vicious circle of action and reaction has spiralled. It culminated in August when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite China’s warnings. The response of the People’s Liberation Army was an unprecedented military exercise in six areas around Taiwan that effectively sealed off the island for three days.

How to avoid a conflict that neither side wants? Simple: let China believe that a peaceful reunification with Taiwan is still possible. This will mean the Taiwanese authorities coming back to the one-China principle and the US reinvigorating the one-China policy it claims to have maintained.

This won’t be easy. In 1992, the mainland and Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang agreed that there was only one China, although they differed in their definitions. But the taiwanese authorities led by Tsai Ing-wen asserted that Taiwan had never accepted the 1992 consensus. Beijing’s worry is that, should the stalemate continue, a Taiwan led by separatist authorities could remain de facto independent for good.

The US insists it respects the one-China principle but sells arms to Taiwan worth tens of billions of dollars. President Joe Biden has more than once said the US would defend Taiwan in an attack from the mainland.

Most recently, the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act proposes to recognise Taiwan as a “major non-Nato ally”. Amid growing tensions, Beijing has to suspect that Washington is developing what Henry Kissinger called “something of a ‘two-China’ solution”.

Washington has to search its soul to answer two questions. First, is Taiwan really America’s asset if it risks dragging the US into a war with a peer competitor? And, if the US doesn’t wish to confront Russia in Ukraine for fear of a third world war, why would it risk confronting China? Repeated American war-gaming has shown that the US might lose in a direct confrontation with China’s military in the Taiwan Strait.

Or is it because China has a much smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia’s and has a “no first use” nuclear policy? Nukes aside, China’s military strength should be no less formidable than Russia’s.

The PLA is the largest armed force in the world. Its military budget is more than triple Russia’s. It even has more naval ships than the US. If Beijing concludes that it is Russia’s next-to-none nuclear stockpile that is deterring the US from intervention, then expanding China’s own nuclear stockpile needs only a change of mind.

Beijing and Washington have a few tactical agreements on avoiding accidents at sea or in the air. The problem is, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait can hardly be accidental. If Beijing believes any suggestions on “guardrails” are simply American guile to handicap China’s reunification efforts, these guardrails will not be established.

Much has been said about how the US could turn Taiwan into a “porcupine” by enhancing its self-defence capabilities. But a few more sea mines, armed drones and anti-ship missiles are hardly game-changing.

Today’s PLA is much more confident and capable of guarding China’s “red lines” than at its last missile exercises in the strait in 1995-1996. A Taiwan Strait that is only 180 kms wide can only feel narrower for the PLA in the future.

Beijing still has strategic patience and that is a chance for Washington. Quite a few Western capitals suspect the war in Ukraine will encourage Beijing to take over Taiwan soon. There is no indication of that.

The best example of Beijing’s patience is the military budget announced after the war in Ukraine began. It remains below 2 per cent of gross domestic product, a level it has maintained for decades. China has never announced a timetable for reunification. After all, what is the use of an island that is shattered?

It is in America’s interests to invigorate rather than hollow out the one-China policy. Given its extensive connection with both sides, it could have a unique role to play as an honest broker. As the first step, Washington should encourage the Taiwanese authorities to accept the one-China consensus.

The one-China pledge made by then-president Ma Ying-jeou gave Taiwan tremendous benefits, including a tacit agreement from the mainland not to shake up Taiwan’s relationship with a handful of countries that diplomatically recognise Taiwan. The sooner Taiwan has a conversation with the mainland, the more it stands to gain. Only in this way can Beijing believe there is still peace to maintain in the strait.

Second, the US needs to exercise more self-discipline. Even if Biden and the Pentagon didn’t like Pelosi’s visit, it still happened. Beijing is not so naive as to believe that Biden couldn’t make a phone call to stop the trip.

Visits to Taiwan by American officials, which are likely to increase, are merely symbolic. But they will invite a steady and substantive Chinese response. Taiwan will feel the ever-harder pinch even as the prospect of a China-US conflict looms larger.

One lesson from the Cold War is that even enemies can find ways to avoid a military conflict. China and the US are not enemies yet. In a cold war where both face mutually assured destruction, the best thing that two competitors can achieve is mutually assured coexistence. War doesn’t have to be inevitable, but prevention requires earnest effort.

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